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and its philosophical implications
Preliminary remarks
The “why” question has made 
a staggering career in philosophy, 
and particularly in metaphys-
ics.1 Many philosophers consider 
that the question expresses the 
very essence of philosophy and is 
something specific to pursuing the 
philosophical discourse, as well as 
it is one of the criteria distinguishing philosophy from exact sciences.2 
Beyond the shadow of a doubt reckoned among these can be Aristotle, 
Gottfried W. Leibniz or, to name a contemporary, Martin Heidegger. In 
the opinion of some philosophers in life sciences such questions are not 
posed, because these sciences limit themselves to only answering the 
question of “how.”3 The “why” question is regarded as crucial especially 
 1  “DIÁ TÍ (gr. διά τί – where-fore?; in Latin: propter quid – owing to what?) – a science-form-
ing question in the classical (Platonic-Aristotelian) theory of science” (M. A. Krąpiec, DIÁ TÍ, http://
www.ptta. pl/pef/pdf/d/diati.pdf [30.01.2018]).
 2  See J. Pelc, O poznawczej roli pytań, in: Prace z pragmatyki, semantyki i metodologii semioty-
ki, ed. J. Pelc, Wrocław 1991, pp. 191–200.
 3  See S. Kamiński, Jak filozofować. Studia z metodologii filozofii klasycznej, Lublin 1989, pas-
sim; M. A. Krąpiec, Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu, Lublin 1994, passim.
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for theistically-oriented metaphysics.4 Attempts at elaborating it and 
demonstrating its key role in the metaphysical discourse are constantly 
made.5 Elimination of this question from philosophy is considered to 
be a manifestation of nonchalance and a lack of understanding of the 
essence of philosophical cognition. Many theoreticians discern that re-
placing the “why” question with the “how” question gave rise to a major 
philosophical crisis and to the emergence of minimalist attitudes (e.g. 
Kamiński). Elimination of this question followed from the tendencies to 
make knowledge practical, and only the answer to the “how” question 
provides a possibility of getting to know facts and the relations between 
them. Thomists believe that it is the metaphysical, and not semiotic ap-
proach that is still of fundamental significance in solving philosophical 
problems, because semiotics reveals only some of the aspects of this ques-
tion, focusing attention on its logical form and omitting its relation with 
the theory of being.6 A proper way of posing this question is only pos-
sible with the presupposition about the realist theory of being.7 Different 
philosophical concepts interpret this question differently. Currently, in 
Poland the semiotic approach in the study of this question is prevalent.8 
Classical philosophers think that the “why” question is the most 
 4  See W. Stróżewski, Istnienie i sens, Kraków 1994, passim; W. Stróżewski, O zasadnicze pyta-
nie metafizyki, „Znak” 17 (1965) no. 127, pp. 3–23.
 5  See J. Wojtysiak, „Dlaczego istnieje raczej coś niż nic?” Analiza problemu w kontekście dysku-
sji we współczesnej filozofii analitycznej, Lublin 2008, passim; J. Wojtysiak, O zasadzie racji dosta-
tecznej, „Roczniki Filozoficzne” 54 (2006) no. 1, pp. 179–216; A. Brożek, Pytania i odpowiedzi. Tło 
filozoficzne, teoria, zastosowania praktyczne, Warszawa 2007, passim.
 6  See M. A. Krąpiec, O rozumienie filozofii, Lublin 1995, passim.
 7  See A. B. Stępień, Wprowadzenie do metafizyki, Kraków 1964, passim.
 8  L. Koj, Analiza pytań I. Problem terminów pierwotnych logiki pytań, in: Studia semiotycz-
ne, ed. and a foreword by J. Pelc, vol. 2, 1971, pp. 99–113; L. Koj, Analiza pytań II. Rozważania nad 
strukturą pytań, in: Studia semiotyczne, vol. 3, 1973 pp. 22–39. Of the most recent works noteworthy 
are: A. Wiśniewski, The Posing of Questions: Logical Foundations of Erotetic Inferences, Dordrecht– 
Boston–London 1995, passim; A. Brożek, O pytaniach filozoficznych i ich rozstrzygalności, „Studia 
Philosophiae Christianae” 45 (2009) no. 1, pp. 7–25, O pojęciach rozstrzygalności i nierozstrzygal-
ności w świetle teorii pytań, in: Філософсвкі проблеми науки / Filozoficzne problemy nauki, ed. A. 
Brożek, Львів–Warszawa 2008, pp. 355–363. This area also includes J. Wojtysiak’s semiotic works 
on the issues concerned with questions.
9 Ontogenesis of the “why” question…
fundamental question for man (e.g. Krąpiec).9 Already children spon-
taneously pose this question to the world.10 Man poses this question 
primarily because the reality he experiences appears to be incompre-
hensible.11 It conveys the basic need to learn and understand the world, 
which – as the Stagirite was right in diagnosing - is specific to every man. 
This question provides a foundation for other questions, e.g. answering 
the question of “how” is predicated on the answer to the question of 
“why.”12 
Philosophers very seldom undertake to analyse the “why” question 
from the perspective of ontogenesis. They believe it to be the preserve of 
psychologists. Also, many claim that at its starting point philosophy is 
autonomous and so it does not have to use psychological data, because 
it can single-handedly reach findings that are no less important than 
the ones achieved in psychology. This, however, by no means implies 
that the results of psychological research are deprecated. Existential 
Thomists themselves, in a more or less conscious manner, brush past the 
 9  In a sense this paper is a debate with the views held by Thomist authors. It is another part 
of the dispute between different paradigms. While this paper lays less emphasis on the compara-
tive element (with no direct juxtaposition of various theoretical approaches to the “why” question), 
giving more space to a systematic approach to the problem, methodologically it fits in with the dis-
course of the classical aporetic philosophy, which confronts various positions with one another - 
classical with contemporary ones - with a view to discovering new problematic situations and sug-
gesting new, controversial solutions, as no other are possible in philosophy.
 10  The “why” question is thus the leading and primordial question-key that opens up the ra-
tionality field resulting from the understanding of being and ontic relationships, which, being real, 
can only be read by the intellect, and not by the senses. The original theory of scientific cognition, 
which the human intellect engages in, is open to the reading out and understanding of the whole 
ontic field within the confines of removing absurdity from that field, that is the contradiction that 
kills acts of cognition (M. A. Krąpiec, DIÁ TÍ, op. cit.). Let me just note that in his works the author 
very often uses the metaphor of “reading out” of the structure of being.
 11  See S. Szuman, Rozwój pytań dziecka. Badania nad rozwojem umysłowości dziecka na tle jego 
pytań, in: Studia nad rozwojem psychicznym dziecka, selected and prepared by M. Przetacznikowa, 
G. Makiełło-Jarża, Warszawa 1985, pp. 274–321; S. Szuman, Rozwój pytań dziecka. Badania nad roz-
wojem umysłowości dziecka na tle jego pytań, Warszawa 1939, passim. A more recent perspective 
that I have drawn on is: Psycholingwistyka, ed. J. B. Gleason, B. N. Ratner, trans. J. Bobryk, Gdańsk 
2005, Chapter 8 is of particular significance for our investigations.
 12  M. A. Krąpiec, Filozofia co wyjaśnia, Lublin 1999, pp. 37–38.
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ontogenesis of questions when they claim that, for instance, such ques-
tions are spontaneously asked by children, or that they are not taught 
such questions, and that it is the real world itself that enforces formula-
tion of such questions on them. All these are theses that concern the 
ontogenesis of questions. Apart from these statements the ontogenesis 
of metaphysical questions is not explored any further. Philosophers who 
tend to focus on getting to know the already fully-fledged subject are less 
interested in the genetic aspect of cognition, which does not help with 
obtaining the integral picture.
We intend to follow the issue concerned with the ontogenesis of the 
“why” question in the present analyses, choosing Jean Piaget, a renowned 
developmental psychologist and the author of genetic epistemology, to 
be our guide.13 It appears that many of his findings still remain theo-
retically valid. Genetic epistemology, which views human cognition as 
the dynamic process of the accretion of increasingly complicated cogni-
tive actions and operations, draws on developmental psychology results 
for its findings.14 Hence it is not a methodologically autonomous disci-
pline. It is interdisciplinary, because in explaining cognition it refers to 
many sciences, additionally subjecting its results to empirical control.15 
However, it is far from a speculative approach characteristic of traditional 
epistemology. It also distances itself from providing definitive answers 
with regard to cognitive actions and operations. By referring to Piaget’s 
 13 See J. Piaget, Psychologia i epistemologia, trans. Z. Zakrzewska, Warszawa 1977; J. Piaget, 
Mowa i myślenie dziecka, trans. J. Kołudzka, Warszawa 2005; M. Kielar-Turska, Przedmowa, in: 
Mowa i myślenie dziecka, trans. J. Kołudzka, Warszawa 2005, passim; J. Piaget, Jak dziecko wyobraża 
sobie świat, trans. M. Gawlik, Warszawa 2006. The noteworthy research papers include: K. Zamiara, 
Epistemologia genetyczna Piageta a społeczny rozwój nauki, Warszawa–Poznań 1979; K. Zamiara, 
Epistemologiczne założenia psychologicznej wizji człowieka, in: Materiały XXVI Zjazdu PTP, Szczecin 
1987, ed. E. Aranowska, Warszawa 1991, M. Kielar-Turska, Średnie dzieciństwo. Wiek przedszkolny, 
in: Psychologia rozwoju człowieka. Podręcznik  akademicki, ed. J. Trempała, Warszawa 2011, passim.
 14 In the present paper I omit to present genetic epistemology in detail, as this would go well be-
yond the compass of the delineated analyses. For that matter I refer the reader to Krysyna Zamiara’s 
metatheoretical works.
 15 J. Piaget, Psychologia i epistemologia, op. cit., pp. 15–42; K. Zamiara, Obecność myślenia psycho-
logicznego w epistemologii, in: Rozprawy i szkice z filozofii i metodologii nauk, ed. J. Such, Warszawa– 
Poznań 1992, pp. 38–52.
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ground-breaking works, we will first undertake a hermeneutic recon-
struction16 of the ontogenesis of the “why” question, and then we will 
try to formulate philosophical implications resulting from this concept.17 
What can a philosopher with a maximalist attitude to studying reality 
learn from Piaget?18
The ontogenesis of the “why” questions according to Jean Piaget
Piaget was a psychologist who was not interested in speculation but 
fact. As he studied the development of child logic, he would always try 
to rely on facts which to varying degrees corroborated his hypotheses. As 
he observed – personally or with the help of his collaborators – children 
in various stages of life, he recorded a number of various types of their 
questions which he tried to classify, taking into account both formal and 
material (substantive)19 criteria. He considered the material criterion to 
be the priority. He also used this criterion to classify the “why” questions 
on account of the fact that with the form alone we cannot tell what type 
of a cause the child is inquiring about. On the basis of this criterion he 
concluded that “there are three big groups of children’s ‘whys’ – the ‘whys’ 
of causal explanation (including finalistic explanation), those of motiva-
tion, and those of justification. Inside each group further shades of dif-
ference may be distinguished. After a certain age (from 7 to 8 onwards) 
there are also the whys of logical justification.”20 The latter ones appear 
in child’s ontogenesis the latest. The term “explanation” refers to either 
 16 It is about hermeneutic analysis. See H. H. Krűger, Wprowadzenie w teorie i metody badawcze 
nauk o wychowaniu, trans. D. Sztobryn, compiled by B. Śliwerski, Gdańsk 2005, pp. 146–147. Let me 
stress that this is not a complete reconstruction of ontogenesis. I draw attention to only those aspects 
of Piaget’s concept which are necessary while discussing the status and role of the “why” question.
 17 These implications should not be treated as necessary statements, but rather as hypotheses 
which of course can be rejected in the presence of other assumptions.
 18 The implications derived will thus concern not only the structure of cognition, but also the 
structure of philosophical theory. Hence, all of them are metatheoretical.
 19 J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., pp. 150–155.
 20 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, trans. Marjorie Warden, London 1926, 
p. 166.
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logical explanation, which consists in a deductive association of certain 
propositions, or to explanation that takes into consideration efficient, 
final causes or psychological motivations.  There are also “whys” con-
cerned with a variety of social rules and norms which the child encoun-
ters in the course of socialisation. They are akin to questions concerned 
with motivations. A child very often asks about the motive behind the 
acceptance of some rule or norm, or, when he is older, about the logi-
cal reason for recognition of a given rule or norm as valid.21 However, 
in view of children’s ambiguous perception of the cause, it is necessary, 
when classifying questions, to take into consideration the material crite-
rion directing attention to the objects that the child is inquiring about. 
Piaget also does not take into account children’s questions specific to the 
egocentric stage. He finds them to be pseudo-questions. In such a kind 
of attitude the child poses a question to himself, and even if he does it in 
the context of adults, he does not require any answer of them. This also 
applies to “dialogues” acted out in the egocentric attitude between age 
peers. Also in this context the questions posed do not presuppose any 
intention of obtaining information from other children. In essence, pas-
sive echoing of adults’ questions is the first ontogenetic step in learning 
them. The child imitates adults without understanding the meaning of 
the interrogative sentences he utters. A child, who is an egocentric, can-
not confront his thoughts and questions with other people, nor can he 
objectivise his thinking, which is always connected with depersonalisa-
tion and attempted adoption of the viewpoint of others.22
The ontogenesis of children’s ‘whys’ begins around the age of 3.
 Until around the age of 7 there is some kind of hypertrophy of ques-
tions put to adults by children. However, the “why” question is not 
a child’s primal question. More fundamental questions posed by children 
are the ones about the location of objects, or about their names. A child 
frequently asks “what is this,” demanding that an adult provide him the 
name of a given object. The first ‘whys’ asked by children follow from 
 21 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., p. 154.
 22  See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., p. 206.
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anxiety and emotional rather than intellectual curiosity.23 A child gradu-
ally passes from this emotional curiosity about the world to intellectual 
curiosity, which comes to be expressed in the formulation of more and 
more sophisticated questions. Asking the “why” questions, which takes 
place around the age of 3, is linked with the formation of various planes 
of reality. Piaget explains that the point is that “up till the age of 3, the 
real may be said to be simply what is desired. There is, indeed, after 1 or 
2 a yes and a no, a real and an unreal, but without any further shade of 
difference. At about 3, on the other hand, the imagined is something dis-
tinct from the real.”24 The emergence of the “why” questions is therefore 
related to a child’s new experience of reality. Until the age of 3 a child ex-
periences conformity of his desires and wishes with reality. Then comes 
the experience of growing resistance from the world. In a child’s expe-
rience his needs and wishes do not conform with the reality of things 
and adults. Gradually, he begins to distinguish the world immediately 
accessible in perception from something that precedes all occurrences, 
and which acts as their constant substratum. That thing is intention. It 
arises as a result of the resistance that a child experiences as put up by 
reality.25 A child begins seeing all phenomena and occurrences as pos-
sessing intentions, purposefulness, some internal forces affecting them. 
Thus, a child’s world becomes populated with intentions attributed to 
things and other persons.26 “It is these intentions ascribed to people and 
to things which will give rise to the types of question corresponding to 
the principal categories of child thought. These categories will therefore 
have an intentionalistic origin, i.e., they will arise from the conscious re-
alization of psychological operations relative to intentions, and not from 
a mere observation of the world given in perception. Moreover, the ear-
lier categories of name and place, etc., will join themselves to these cat-
egories of intention, and together with them will form a single whole.”27 
 23 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., p. 152.
 24 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 231.
 25 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., p. 204.
 26 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., pp. 202–203.
 27 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 234.
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Thus, the first “why” questions formulated by children first and foremost 
concern intentions underlying an action or an occurrence. The first ‘why’ 
asked by a child therefore refers to human actions.
The “why” questions relate to various types of causality. Before a child 
acquires an ability to use the notion of cause, he treats himself as a cause 
initiating many actions. Obviously, he does not realise that, which still 
justifies speaking about causality irrespective of the degree of conscious 
realisation.28 Conscious realisation of causality forms gradually along 
with the development of actions and mental operations, and leads to 
distinguishing various types of causality, such as: animistic, finalistic, 
mechanistic, dynamic, etc. Therefore, causality does not follow from per-
ceptions. It is not an effect of some simple abstract generalisation. It is 
a dynamic category which passes through its stages of becoming mani-
fest in the course of ontogenesis, which results in some types of causal-
ity yielding to others, e.g. animistic causality gradually yields ground to 
mechanistic causality based on spatial contact between objects. 
The first “why” questions about causality do not, however, refer to 
mechanistic causality. At this stage a child cannot think in terms of cau-
sality, which is about spatial contact between objects. As he asks “why,” he 
is looking for forces and intentions underlying objects and occurrences. 
Most questions are posed with regard to animate beings, and statistically 
fewer questions relate to inanimate objects. To a child, who ascribes in-
tentions and forces to objects and persons, there is no room for chance in 
the world. It is a whole of closely interrelated occurrences and situations. 
Everything happens out of some necessity. As Piaget writes, “a world in 
which chance does not exist is a far less mechanical and far more anthro-
pomorphic a world than ours.”29 Agnosticism of everyday life,30 which is 
connected with the introduction of the category of chance, appears later 
on, when a child discovers the fact of death. To an adult, who uses the 
 28 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., p. 200.
 29 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 174.
 30 The point here is that some attitude arises when the cognisant subject realises that there is 
room for chance in the world, that not everything is purposefully organised, that some phenomena 
are unknowable and their occurrence is impossible to be anticipated.
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notion of mechanistic causality, in the world there is room for chance con-
sisting in mutually independent causal chains intersecting one another. 
Between the years of 7 and 8 a child cannot use the notion of causation 
of this type. Causality is of a purposeful character and is more concerned 
with psychological motivation. It does not have a character of spatial con-
tact between two objects. Piaget even goes as far as to say that what we 
are dealing with at this stage is not so much causality as precausality. He 
claims that “we shall designate by the name of precausality this primitive 
relation in which causation still bears the marks of a quasi-psychological 
motivation. One of the forms taken by this precausality is the anthropo-
morphic explanation of nature. In this case, the causes of phenomena are 
always confused with the intentions of the Creator or with those of men, 
who are the makers of mountains and rivers. But even if no ‘intention’ can 
be detected in this anthropomorphic form, the ‘reason’ which the child 
tries to give for phenomena is far more in the nature of a utilitarian reason 
or of a motive than of spatial contact.”31 This precausality is conditioned 
by a child’s “intellectual realism.” A child constantly tends to supplement 
that which he sees with thought. The reality he experiences is much more 
of a construct of his than a product provided by pure observation. In this 
sense, a child’s realism is not a visual realism but an intellectual one. If we 
observe a child less than 7 years of age, then we are “struck by the extent 
to which his vision is distorted by his ideas.”32 That is why a child does not 
look for explanations based on mechanistic causality (spatial contact), but 
in keeping with intellectual realism he seeks motivations and intentions 
(finalism) in phenomena and occurrences. The explanations provided by 
a child are not characterised by logical deduction. “For the child, an event 
leading to an event, a motive leading to an action, and an idea leading to 
an idea are all one and the same thing; or rather, the physical world is still 
confused with the intellectual or psychical world.”33 In this period a child 
evinces an all-encompassing tendency to justify everything. And in this 
 31 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 181.
 32 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 183.
 33 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 184.
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he is different from adults, who first accept the existence of chance, and 
second believe that some things and occurrences cannot be explained. 
A child rejects that which in experience is given as accidental, unrelated 
or simply chaotic. In the attitude of intellectual realism “the child can-
not grasp the idea of the ‘given,’ and he refuses to admit that experience 
contains fortuitous concurrences which simply happen without being 
accounted for. Thus, there is in the child a tendency towards justifica-
tion at all costs, a spontaneous belief that everything is connected with 
everything else, and that everything can be explained by everything else. 
Such a mentality necessarily involves a use of causality which is other than 
mechanical, which tends to justification as much as to explanation, and 
thus once more gives rise to the notion of precausality.”34
The tendency to explain everything by everything else is based on 
syncretism. Under the age of 7 a child’s perception and intelligence are es-
sentially syncretic. Intellectual realism and syncretism in perception and 
thinking are interrelated.35 Syncretism in thinking (verbal intelligence) 
and in perception (perceptual intelligence) in the child consist in refer-
ring to general analogous schemas of a perceptual and notional character. 
Application of these schemas involves understanding of diverse parts. 
Schemas are typically of an indefinite and hardly analytic character, 
which facilitates combining them into a more or less coherent wholes. 
A child’s perception is syncretic, comprehensive and does not focus on 
decoding details. Consequently, the child does not discern nuances re-
quired, for instance, to comprehend the spatial contact between objects, 
which is specific to mechanistic causality. A child cannot adjust to details. 
As Piaget claims, syncretic perception in a sense compels the child to 
connect a thing with a thought itself. Connecting everything with every-
thing is for him (the stage of 5-6 years of age) a matter of necessity. The 
sense of necessity precedes all explanation. That is why the answer to the 
“why” questions posed by children might as well be “because it must be 
so.” However, as he observes and catalogues children’s questions, Piaget 
 34 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 184.
 35 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., p. 167.
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notes that “as a general rule... the child confuses human necessity (moral 
and social, the ‘decus’) with physical necessity. (The idea of law has long 
retained the traces of this complex origin). A great many of the ‘whys’ of 
children, therefore, do no more than appeal to this feeling of necessity 
[...]. The connexion will now be seen between this type of explanation 
and precausality, which is precisely the result of a confusion between the 
psychical or intellectual world, or the world of ethical or logical necessity 
and the world of mechanical necessity.”36
Piaget also notes that thinking in terms of the categories of precau-
sality and intellectual realism is conditioned by primitive egocentrism. 
For a long time it stands in the way of the child moving up to the level 
of objective (intersubjective) thinking, which is always connected with 
confronting one’s thoughts with others, which has its origins in asking 
questions like: “what is this?,” “where is it?,” “why is that so?”  The more 
the child is focused on his own Self, the less capable he is of becoming 
free from animistic beliefs, from treating all things and phenomena in 
terms of intentions and underlying forces which affect their emergence. 
“We can now see that ego-centrism, while it does not exactly explain the 
child’s incapacity for true causal explanation and logical justification, is 
nevertheless closely connected with it. And we can understand how, as 
a result of this, the child’s mind is always hovering between these two 
convergent paths, and is also equally removed from both. This it is that 
gives rise to the phenomena of precausality and intellectual realism, both 
of which bear witness to this intermediate position. And this it is also that 
gives rise to that tendency in children to justify things at any price, or to 
connect everything with everything else.”37
In fact, between the ages of 3 and 7 a child asks about everything. As 
he adopts the attitude of intellectual realism, his thinking and perception 
being syncretic, he consequently apprehends everything that he expe-
riences in the categories of animistic, artificial and psychological cau-
sality. However, in the course of ontogenesis, the notion of precausality 
 36 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 187-188.
 37 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 238.
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gradually disappears. The questions asked by children (aged 7-8) more 
and more frequently feature a pure notion of causation related to mecha-
nistic causality. More and more often, the child pays attention to the de-
tails of various things, and learns to discern the spatial contact between 
them. The relative number of “why” questions decreases, giving more 
and more way to emerging questions concerned with reality and history 
as well as logical explanation. “In logical justification, thought becomes 
conscious of its own independence, of its possible mistakes, and of its 
conventions, it no longer seeks to justify the things in themselves, but 
its own personal judgements about them. Such a process as this appears 
late in the psychological evolution of the child.”38 It probably takes place 
around the age of 7 or 8, which is connected with the gradual disappear-
ance of animistic thinking. The gradual disappearance of the “why” ques-
tions results from the fact that a child begins to ask completely different 
questions that are supposed to supplement his knowledge. Answers to 
the “why” questions typically provide general knowledge. But the child 
evinces a constant and unbridled need to acquire specific knowledge 
which satisfies the requirements of logical justification and coherence. 
Apart from questions about the reality of events and their history, the 
child also poses questions about rules, which are to an ever greater ex-
tent liberated from the pressure of anthropomorphic and psychological 
ideas. As regards rules, he inquires about the logical justification of their 
applicability. The child also begins to ask more questions concerned with 
counting and classification of the surrounding objects. He inquires not 
only about the name of a given object, but also about its definition use-
ful in understanding it. In Piaget’s opinion, the questions about rules, 
names and definitions are normative questions.39 The noticeably declin-
ing number of questions concerned with precausality is related to the 
gradual disappearance of ego-centric thinking. Ego-centrism, which 
to a greater degree obeys the logic of personal whims and desires, may 
 38 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 194.
 39 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., pp. 183–190.
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for a long time hold the child captive, acting as a direct obstacle to the 
achievement of logical systematisation and depersonalised thinking.40
One of the ways to verify the decrease in thinking in terms of precau-
sality is to ask a child some questions which he formulated before the age 
of 7.  When you ask a child over the age 7 questions which he asked at 6 or 
7, he expresses surprise and sometimes also confusion. In a situation like 
this he tends to correct the adult, saying that such questions should not be 
asked, because they are nonsensical, or he provides answers that take into 
account mechanistic causality or logical justification relating to specific 
inferential relationships between judgements. Piaget was painstaking 
about recording and systematising, according to the material criterion, 
questions asked by a child named Del.  He concluded that the notion of 
precausality used by Del was becoming increasingly varied, which was 
connected with the gradual replacement of mechanistic causality with 
quest for logical justifications. He also observed that the receding of pre-
causality is connected with the vanishing of anthropomorphic and arti-
ficialistic thinking. He writes as follows: “There is, therefore, a complete 
discord between the questions asked by Del and the manner in which he 
answers them a few months later, and this seems to indicate that the child 
has partly given up the use of precausal explanations. The questions were 
originally put as though a precausal explanation were possible, as though 
everything in nature could be accounted for, as though everything were 
animated by intentions, so that the looked-for cause of phenomena could 
be identified.”41 The answers given by Del did not take into account the 
notion of precausality. This was related to the fact that in his mind there 
appeared correct distinctions between different types of causation link-
ing objects. This does not, however, mean that in the period in question 
the child has already acquired a pure notion of mechanistic causation or 
logical justification. For a much longer period of ontogenesis this justifi-
cation will continue to be mixed up with psychological justification. Only 
at an older age (11-12 years) do causal explanation and logical justification 
 40 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., p. 206.
 41 See J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 225.
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become “pure,” that is without the admixture of the looked-for psycho-
logical motivation.
As Piaget emphasises, the “why” questions involve three functions:
explicatory, implicatory and mixed.42 These functions are dynamic. 
At first they appear to be in some state of undifferentiation. It is only in 
the course of ontogenesis that they gradually develop and gain inde-
pendence, turning into functions linked with the increasingly complex 
actions and reversible cognitive operations. At the beginning of ontogen-
esis the explicatory function is the most dominant one. This results from 
the need that the child is experiencing when he realises the existence of 
the intention arising under the influence of the resistance caused by the 
discrepancy between desires and things. Then he feels the need to attri-
bute those intentions to other objects and persons whose resistance he 
is experiencing. This function has two poles: psychological explanation 
and material explanation. In the initial period of ontogenesis these poles 
overlap. Only in later stages do they gradually diverge.43 This function 
is oriented towards the outside world. It is directed at reality, time, place 
and causality. Originally, the implicatory function arises in response to 
the child seeking underlying intentions and forces in objects. This func-
tion too has two poles; one is psychological and the other is concerned 
with names, classifications, that is logical justification. Thus, the implica-
tory function is directed not at things, but intentions, motives and ideas. 
In the course of ontogenesis this function in a sense becomes special-
ised and begins to play an ever greater role in thinking, which gradually 
leaves behind the stage of precausality. In its fully-developed form the 
implicatory function is specific to logical justification. Then, it turns to 
classification, name-giving, capturing specific logical relations between 
judgements. The question about names and definitions is connected with 
the implicatory function. To an ever-decreasing extent it is concerned 
with real things (the explicatory function), and to an ever-increasing 
extent it is concerned with notions and definitions that depend on them. 
 42 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., pp. 203–204.
 43 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., p. 204.
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This is because logical justification is about focusing on the relations be-
tween statements, and not things. At this stage the child can capture the 
independence of a thought and a thing. The explicatory and implicatory 
functions can also take the form of a mixed function, which turns to the 
motivation of actions as well as justification of rules and norms, which 
the child encounters in the course of social development. As these func-
tions develop and become differentiated, so do the child’s questions with 
regard to their substance, which is pointed to by the paradoxical fact that 
“child thought is equally removed from dealing with strictly causal expla-
nation as it is from dealing with logical justification properly so-called. 
The whole mechanism of children’s questions, as we have studied it, can 
be accounted for by this fundamental fact.”44 
The philosophical implications of the ontogenesis of  
the “why” question
(1) The ontogenesis of the “why” questions provides a number of in-
teresting implications which, on the one hand, confirm, while the other 
hand question a number of theses propounded by, for instance, Thomist 
metaphysicists. It is worthwhile drawing attention to several metatheo-
retical issues connected with this. At first, one should remember that no 
explicit philosophical implications result directly from the ontogenesis of 
questions itself. If we speak about them, then only as some interpretative 
consequences.45 And each one of these interpretations is always relativ-
ised to a specific philosophical hermeneutic.46 Hence, the implications 
 44 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 237.
 45 See J. Woleński, W stronę logiki, Kraków 1996, passim; J. Turek, Filozoficzne interpretacje fak-
tów naukowych, Lublin 2009, passim; J. Turek, Implikacje ontologiczne typu redukcyjnego jako meto-
da uprawiania filozofii przez Księdza Profesora Kazimierza Kłósaka, in: Filozofia a nauka w myśli – 
Księdza Kazimierza Kłósaka, ed. Z. Liana, A. Michalik, Kraków–Tarnów 2004, pp. 63–88; Z. Hajduk, 
Filozofia przyrody – Filozofia przyrodoznawstwa. Metakosmologia, Lublin 2004, passim. I write about 
the problems of interpretation of scientific facts in greater detail in: P. Duchliński, W stronę apore-
tycznej filozofii klasycznej, Kraków 2014.
 46 See J. Woleński, W stronę logiki, op. cit., passim; J. Woleński, Logika, kontekst odkrycia, kon-
tekst uzasadniania, in: Odkrycie naukowe i inne zagadnienia współczesnej filozofii i nauki. Pamięci 
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derived will not, perforce, be shared by many philosophers, especially 
those who defend the epistemological autonomy of philosophy in rela-
tion to empirical sciences, and who at the starting point voice necessary 
statements, distancing themselves from any hypotheses.47 Undoubtedly, 
Piaget’s genetic epistemology is a science firmly embedded in the em-
pirical data of developmental psychology.48 Still, one needs to remember 
that Piaget’s goal was epistemological, for he was striving to answer the 
question of “how is cognition possible?”49 In order to answer this ques-
tion one needs to follow the way cognition gradually develops, the way 
the human mind acquires certain categories and structures that enable 
it to experience the real world in the way it does. Piaget was critical of 
all speculative metaphysics of cognition, as he did not believe that it was 
impossible to pursue epistemology which could not legitimise its results 
in the form of theoretically encapsulated empirical experience. His re-
search was done with a view to accomplishing specified epistemological 
goals. In all this discussion the crucial thing is that the implications de-
rived from ontogenesis come to be test-proven in the empirical facts con-
cerned with the development of cognitive structures.50 It appears then 
Elżbiety Pietruskiej-Madej i Jana Żytkowa, ed. W. Krajewski, W. Strawiński, Warszawa 2003, pp. 75– 
87; J. Woleński, O tak zwanych filozoficznych założeniach nauki, in: Z zagadnień filozofii nauk przy-
rodniczych, ed. S. Butryma, Warszawa 1991, pp. 7–16.
 47 At the starting point for philosophical inquiry it is worth using the proposition formulated 
by Heller. It is a non-foundationalist strategy. “I am inclined - writes Heller - to regard critical dis-
cussion as a crucial element in the method which I have called a «method of loops», provided the 
method is employed in philosophy [...] It is not an easy postulate, because every debate (and especial-
ly one with a real opponent) triggers some psychological mechanisms of defence and aggression. To 
be able to oppose them from the very beginning, it is worthwhile couching one’s views (even if they 
are best-founded) not in the form of categorical statements, but hypotheses that allow enough lee-
way for modification or reformulation. But a philosopher’s work does not end with a formulation of 
a hypothesis. The hypothesis comes to be included in the «non-linear cycle of thought». Philosophy 
is not about reaching conclusions that are then filed away and forgotten” (M. Heller, Przeciw fun-
dacjonizmowi, in: M. Heller, Filozofia i Wszechświat, Kraków 2006, p. 100).
 48 See A. Bronk, Demarkacjonizm lubelskiej szkoły filozoficznej, „Roczniki Filozoficzne” 35 (1987) 
bull. 1, pp. 345–364.
 49 J. Piaget, Psychologia i epistemologia, op. cit., p. 15.
 50 See J. Życiński, Zagadnienie możliwości falsyfikacji twierdzeń w filozofii przyrody, „Analecta 
Cracoviensia” 14 (1982), pp. 94–98. The author cites examples from philosophy of nature.
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that in this way it can be shown how philosophical theses (of Thomistic 
metaphysics) can be corroborated or negatively tested by ontogenetic 
data. The example of questions is very meaningful here, because both 
philosophers and psychologists believe that questions play quite a signifi-
cant role in cognition of the world and man.51 Underlying the positive 
approach to philosophical implications of ontogenesis is the premise that 
philosophy can substantially benefit from the results of empirical science 
research. They can be a precious complement to semantic and ontologi-
cal analyses, and result in correction of a number of exotic propositions 
regarded by some philosophers as definitively true or uncorrectable. This 
obviously presupposes a concept of philosophy which is at least partly 
open to the results of various exact sciences.52 However, without any 
exaggerated fear that such a philosophy might lose its epistemological 
and methodological status.
(2) The results of ontogenetic research certainly prove that children 
ask “why” questions in a spontaneous way and under the influence of the 
things or other persons’ actions that they experience. Besides, they vali-
date the thesis, so frequently propounded by philosophers, whereby it is 
from childhood that man seeks information which is necessary not only 
to understand the world, but also to be able to effectively adjust to it. With 
the benefit of the ontogenesis of questions we obtain a dynamic picture of 
human knowledge and cognition. Cognition is a process which over the 
course of years gets complicated, which can be proven by the accretion 
of new cognitive actions and operations. Many contemporary authors 
strongly emphasise this dynamic of cognition, even though many still 
 51 See R. Radwiłowicz, O pytaniach uczniowskich ogólnie, in: Pytania uczniów a treść nauczania, 
ed. R. Radwiłowicz, K. Pauzewicz, C. Kosiński, Warszawa 1969, passim; R. Fisher, Stawianie pytań, 
in: R. Fisher, Uczymy jak uczyć, Warszawa 1999, passim.
 52 “The crux of the matter is that propositions including a hermeneutic factor can be elucidat-
ed in a manner understandable to persons using different hermeneutic systems, or hermeneutics 
in short, whereby they acquire an intersubjectively communicable meaning, while they do not need 
to become empirically verifiable. Arguably one is allowed to say that they become somehow verifi-
able with regard to their hermeneutic content, but as I have stressed before, it is a matter of second-
ary importance. In essence, it is about the question of understanding” (J. Woleński, Sens i nonsens 
w filozofii, in: J. Woleński, W stronę logiki, op. cit., p. 350).
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follow the well-trodden path of traditional approaches, viewing cogni-
tion in a “frozen” manner.
(3) The ontogenesis of questions also implies sceptical conclusions 
concerning the ideal of disinterested cognition.  It is about such a type of 
cognition whereby we perform specific cognitive actions for their own 
sake only, and not because of some outside pragmatic or utilitarian goals. 
One might wonder when and at what point in his life man asks questions 
expressive of his cognitive disinterestedness. From the perspective of on-
togenesis, a child inquires about names of objects or their location only to 
be able to use them more capably. Here, cognition is subservient to other 
goals, e.g. better adaptation to the surroundings or proper execution of 
instructions issued by adults. As Piaget shows, a child’s primitive goals 
are typically utilitarian. And that is a completely adequate and normal 
situation from the developmental viewpoint. A small child does not in-
quire for the sake of inquiring, unless he is at a very early stage of onto-
genesis, when he only repeats after the adults certain sounds the meaning 
of which he can hardly comprehend, or when he is in some morbid state 
displaying, e.g., some compulsive behaviour the symptoms of which 
can be notorious questioning without any clear communication-related 
goal. The problem of how to understand disinterested cognition arises. 
Disinterested with regard to whom? If cognition is related to some object, 
then it must always involve some interest in the object. If there were no 
moment of interest, then we could not perform any cognitive actions. 
Why would we want to become cognisant of anything, if we were not 
interested in it in the first place? But man, as the subject of cognition, 
asks a great many questions and he always does that for specific purposes. 
Even if those are only theoretical purposes devoid of practical reference, 
he never does that out of purely cognitive necessity, for such kinds of 
isolated necessity do not exist, but because of definite intentions and 
practical motives deeply set in his mind. As we ask “why,” we are looking 
for specific information which will not only satisfy our need for knowl-
edge, but will also contribute to the achievement of greater mental and 
emotional comfort, the lack of which generates this type of questions in 
the first place. The ideal of disinterested cognition has a character of an 
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abstract postulate which is far removed from the way in which people 
really perceive reality. Ontogenesis does philosophy no mean favour by 
showing that asking questions is never conditioned by some disinterest-
edness, but by interest in specific objects of questions (interest in the real 
world). If there were no interest of this kind, which does not have to be 
purely utilitarian, a question would never be asked.
(4) Ontogenetic data may challenge some philosophical theses.
For instance, according to Thomist metaphysicists a child asks “why,” 
because he wants to understand the ontic structure of things. However, 
with the benefit of ontogenesis we know that children ask this question 
not for intellectual reasons, but as a result of emotional motivation which 
is expressed by surprise and confusion. Moreover, one can hardly ac-
cept the theses whereby all questions are reducible to or grounded in the 
“why” question. The study of children’s questions provides an opposite 
thesis. The “why” question is not a basis for other questions. Nor can 
other questions be reduced to it. On the contrary, this question needs to 
be supplemented or replaced with other questions. Answers to the “why” 
questions provide general knowledge, which calls for particularisation by 
means of formulating further questions. Besides, it is hard to get a handle 
on the postulated reduction of all questions to the “why” question, which 
is put forth by some, e.g. Thomist authors. We do not know whether the 
reduction is supposed to be semiotic, epistemological or of some other 
kind. The sense of this reduction is usually not explained (e.g. Krąpiec). 
Given ontogenesis, we can conclude that the “why” question by no means 
determines the cognitive development, i.e., its hypertrophy occurs only 
within a specified period of development, which gradually grows smaller, 
giving ground to other types of questions, which are, from the ontoge-
netic viewpoint, no less important than the “why” question. Still, it seems 
that the so-called categorical questions better contribute to the develop-
ment of cognition, because they enable acquisition of specific knowledge, 
which is much more useful for adaptive reasons.
(5) The ontogenesis of questions also gives rise to implications of 
quite considerable relevance for the understanding of the realism of 
human cognition.  Apparently, we are not realists as loyal to reality as 
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we are expected to be by some philosophers, especially realistically-
inclined Thomist metaphysicists. Research on children’s early cognitive 
development proves that a child’s realism is not visual, but intellectual. 
Regularities concerned with a child’s perception of reality are discov-
ered on the basis of the analysis of modal questions. To a child, reality 
is something rather constructed than passively reflected.53 Even though 
a child’s thinking is realistic, it is done in the spirit of intellectual real-
ism. A child’s suppositions concerned with reality are less stable than 
the ones of an adult. To us, reality is more stable, definite, and besides an 
adult can clearly distinguish between thought and reality. He can per-
form complicated processes of logical justification concerning relation-
ships between judgements and not things. On the one hand, a child finds 
real reality to be more arbitrary, because it is populated by the world of 
thoughts considered to be as real as physical objects. On the other hand, 
a child’s world is more stabilised due to the fact that there is no random-
ness about it.54 As regards possibility, it is a certain degree of reality to an 
adult. But to a child, possibility is no degree of reality, but it is as real as 
anything else. This shows that we are never realists in the sense that we 
reflect reality, which strikes our apparatus with the “edge of its being.” 
We never hang on to this reality unwaveringly, not as children, because 
we embrace the attitude of intellectual realism, and not as adults, for 
whom thought and reality do not combine in an unambiguous manner. 
From the viewpoint of ontogenesis of cognition the fact that man can 
detach himself from reality and only use thoughts is a manifestation of 
normal development realistically construed. Clinging tightly to things, 
on the other hand, is an indication of ego-centric thinking, for which 
the world and thought constitute an undifferentiated whole. Besides, any 
formal operations that arrive for good between the age of 11 and 12 can 
be successfully performed only because we are able to detach a thought 
from a real thing and concentrate on intellectual operations themselves 
of a reproducible character, e.g. mathematical operations.  That is why the 
 53 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., p. 165.
 54 See J. Piaget, Mowa i myślenie dziecka, op. cit., pp. 186–187.
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choice between acquiring cognition and thinking, which is promoted by 
Thomists, cannot be, from the viewpoint of ontogenetic data, validated 
at all.55 Acquiring cognition and thinking are so closely intertwined that 
it would be difficult to pinpoint in a man’s development the moment at 
which he thinks but does not become cognisant, or vice versa. The fact 
that we can think while becoming detached from things is not an indica-
tion of degeneration, but of normal development. Clinical examples of 
persons with autistic and ego-centric disorders clearly show what hap-
pens to a man who constantly remains on the plane of intellectual real-
ism. However, philosophers tend to voice abstract propositions contrary 
to previously voiced ones, because they do not take into consideration 
empirical data concerned with children’s cognitive development. Piaget 
aptly sums up this situation: “The child shows signs of a perpetual in-
tellectual realism: he is too much of a realist to be a logician, and too 
much of an intellectualist to be a pure observer. The physical world and 
the world of ideas still constitute for him an undifferentiated complex; 
causality and motivation are still thought of as one and the same. Adults 
too, with the exception of metaphysicists and naive realists, regard the 
connexion of events and that of ideas as one, in the sense that logic and 
reality constitute two series inextricably bound up with each other. But 
the adult is sufficiently detached from his ego and from his ideas to be 
an objective observer, and sufficiently detached from external things to 
be able to reason about assumptions or hypotheses held us such. This 
brings about a twofold liberation and a twofold adaptation of the mind. 
The child’s ideas, on the other hand, hinder his observations, and his ob-
servations hinder his ideas, whence his equal and correlative ignorance 
of both reality and logic.”56
Philosophers have a right to put on the “why” question interpreta-
tions that follow from their presuppositions. And since each philoso-
pher adopts presuppositions that differ in substance, there are so many 
 55 See M. A. Krąpiec, Poznawać czy myśleć. Problemy epistemologii tomistycznej, Lublin 2000, 
passim. 
 56 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, op. cit., p. 214.
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differences in the interpretation of the “why” question occurring between 
Thomists and followers of Leibniz or Heidegger. Ontogenesis only shows 
the way logic of such questions develops. But it does not determine their 
metaphysical interpretation in any way. Thomists often invoke psychol-
ogy, which in their opinion confirms spontaneous realism as a natural 
cognitive attitude, thereby reinforcing the conviction that being is the 
first object of cognition.57 Indeed, psychology confirms that realism is 
a child’s natural cognitive attitude, but it is not the kind of realism that 
Thomist metaphysicists write about. It is not a direct realism connected 
with the reflection in cognitive processes of things in real existence, but 
an intellectual (constructive) realism.
(6) With the benefit of ontogenetic data we learn that a child first for-
mulates questions not with regard to things, but actions performed. “The 
earliest ‘whys’ are generally asked in connexion with human actions. The 
first ‘why’ noted by Scupin in the case of ‘Bubi’ is of this order. The child’s 
mother was lying on the ground. The boy wants to get her up: «du bist 
ja nicht tot, warum stehste nicht immersu auf?». The second one appears 
when the child is forbidden to pull the petals off flowers. «Warum denn?». 
But even where children begin with a “why of explanation,” it is difficult 
not to see in the expected explanation not only a precausal explanation, 
but one in which precausality is almost entirely confused with psycho-
logical or intentional causality: «Why do trees have leaves?».”58 Therefore, 
real being does not take centre stage of a child’s attention. But when it 
becomes the object of his attention, the child asks “why” questions con-
cerned with animistic or artificialistic causality. He does not originally 
strive to understand the nature of things with regard to its relations or 
constitutive factors. Nor does he take into consideration the efficient 
causes, either external or internal ones. Looking for them appears in 
time, when the child learns to use the category of mechanistic causation. 
This shows that our primitive interest in the world is not concerned with 
 57 Even though it is just one of interpretative hypotheses, Thomists find it to be the definitive 
interpretation.
 58 J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child op. cit., p. 165.
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understanding of things, but intentions, motives and forces. In the early 
period of ontogenesis we are not interested in understanding the struc-
ture of an object, but in the underlying intentions. That is why finalistic 
causality takes centre stage. All this is related to the intentional devel-
opment in a person, who experiences that which is real in the form of 
resistance against the background of the growing incongruity between 
his desires and thoughts, and reality. It is against the backdrop of this 
incongruity that the primitive intentionality of a child’s mind is formed 
and the world begins to be populated with new ontology, which presup-
poses the existence of underlying intentions and forces which determine 
various phenomena and objects.
It may be difficult to bring ontogenetic data in objective align-
ment with statements that read, for instance, as follows: “The question 
[«why» – P. D.] is a spontaneous question which both children and adults 
ask when something is not self-evidently understandable – when there 
are some hidden factors incomprehensible with regard to the state of af-
fairs. The «why» question is essentially connected with the aspect of un-
derstanding of a cognisable thing.”59 The child may look for factors, but 
ones that primarily concern understanding of human actions, and even 
if he is looking for them in things, he is out for intentions and underly-
ing forces, and not for analogous relations that constitute the structure of 
being. The author’s statement which has been quoted here shows how in-
terpretations of the experience of the real world, in which questions play 
a specific role, are performed in philosophy in a highly theorised form. 
(7) Many philosophers declare outright that the purpose of philo-
sophical endeavour should be to find the ultimate causes that explain 
reality (Thomists) This quest for ultimate explanation has had a very 
long history and is connected with some tendency to construct maximal-
ist philosophical systems, within which everything might be ultimately 
understood on the basis of some direct data defying any epistemological 
problematisation. Today this feature of philosophical research has come 
to be challenged by many philosophical trends. It is being dismissed by 
 59 M. A. Krąpiec, Filozofia co wyjaśnia, op. cit., p. 37.
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continental philosophers who trace their origins to hermeneutics and 
postmodernism, as well as by philosophers of science and analysts of 
every hue. What does this problem look like from the viewpoint of on-
togenesis? From the viewpoint of the ontogenesis of cognition, the ten-
dency to find ultimate explanation for everything is a feature typifying 
thinking displayed by a child aged between 3 and 7. In that period the 
child is not capable of using the notion of mechanistic causation or of 
logical justification. His thinking is overpowered by anthropomorphism 
and artificialism. The child believes that everything is connected with 
everything by some kind of necessity. There is no room for chance in 
a child’s world. That is why he looks for explanations that from the view-
point of older age very often do not make any sense. This is well illustrat-
ed by tests demonstrating the disappearance of the notion of precausality 
in children between the age of 7 and 8. As mentioned before, in a child’s 
world as yet there is no notion of chance, which appears much later, at 
the moment when the child discovers the regularities concerned with 
life and death. The adult world is different. Everything is not connected 
with everything. There are chance occurrences and circumstances un-
der which the intersecting causal chains are not cognizable. To an adult 
there are occurrences and situations which cannot be explained, much 
less explained forcibly and ultimately by referring to factors contrary to 
the knowledge you possess, or anthropomorphic factors suggestive of 
underlying forces and intentions in things. But adults can put up with 
a child’s questions, even if from the viewpoint of their knowledge they 
have no cognitive relevance. The stage of constantly looking for relation-
ships between everything and everything, and explanations based on 
types of causation mixed up in the child’s mind is specific to the stage of 
ego-centric thinking. With the aid of perception and syncretic thinking 
the child sees the world as a complex of interlinked phenomena, without 
paying particular attention to nuances and details. As a result of this, he 
introduces underlying forces and intentions in place of spatial contact. 
Might that mean that philosophers who sometimes like obsessed go on 
seeking for ultimate explanations have not grown out of the stage of ego-
centric thinking yet? Are they still in the world in which there is no room 
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for chance, and where everything is related to everything by some inner 
necessity? If we literally referred the findings of ontogenesis to philo-
sophical “work,” one might conclude that in fact some philosophers are 
just like “big babies” who try to outshout one another, proving who has 
got a better explanation of the world. Maybe many will find such obser-
vations to be an indication of some misunderstanding testifying to the 
fact that the author of these words fails to understand what philosophi-
cal endeavour is about. However, this sarcastic remark is more about 
drawing attention to a certain type of psychological mentality which 
typifies philosophical thinking, rather than about reproaching other 
philosophers for childish thinking. After all, a mature philosopher who 
has really got the hang of the research tools of the trade knows very well 
(or should know) that such ultimate justifications in the sphere of such 
abstract theories as philosophy cannot be attained without accepting 
a number of conventional decisions.60 Reality alone does not offer any 
definite ontological or semantic solutions. Nor does it suggest any lan-
guage game which might perform the role of a universal lexicon provid-
ing descriptions of all facts and the relations between them. Regardless of 
whether philosophers evince a tendency towards ego-centric thinking, it 
needs to be recognised that ontogenesis furnishes sufficient empirically 
corroborated evidence that given a properly and normally developed 
cognitive apparatus ultimate justifications are hardly acceptable.61 On 
 60 These issues can be explored in greater detail within the framework of the so-called psychol-
ogy of philosophising, which points to some correlations between a philosopher’s personality and 
the theory he develops. For more on this see J. Pieter, Psychologia filozofowania, Katowice 2005. It 
should be borne in mind that adoption of a philosophical paradigm is conditional upon subjective 
factors. In Poland this issue was addressed by Józef Życiński in his writings.
 61 Of course, a philosopher who is self-conscious about his investigations might find such state-
ments to be disparaging about his creative work. However, the author of these words does not mean 
disparagement of philosophers, but rather an attempt at a realistic approach to that which the so-
called “good philosophical work” is about. In the author’s estimation it is nothing else but an attempt 
at dealing with specific, so-called problem situations which emerge in both the field of philosophy 
itself and at the interface of various sciences, e.g. philosophy and empirical sciences or philosophy 
and social sciences.   Confrontation with a problematic situation releases tentative interpretative hy-
potheses aimed at explicating that problem situation without pointing to some magical final solu-
tion. These hypotheses are firmly grounded in the existing knowledge which has given rise to the 
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the plane of logical justifications there is never any ultimate certainty, un-
less we decree that ourselves. To some such an attitude may appear to be 
a manifestation of megalomania and pompous dogmatism defying any 
refutation. Thought objectivisation is always the case in confrontation 
with others, who usually hold different views on the same objects, events 
and other people. This results in the conclusion that there is no single 
viewpoint, not only in the world of everyday experience, but also not in 
science, which is democratic enough to allow of a multitude of various 
perspectives, from which it still demands empirical validation. In this 
respect philosophy enjoys much greater latitude than science, because it 
does not have to put its assertions to the test of experimentation.
(8) Ontogenetic data also refute the myth propagated by positivists,
whereby cognition is entirely derived from sense data.  We do not 
perceive any sensations or sense data. When we perceive a tree, we do not 
first see the trunk, bark, leaves or branches, but at once we perceive a cer-
tain whole, a certain and definite Gestalt. Cognition of an object is not 
passive. It is related to interaction with it and recasting it by assimilation. 
What we perceive is co-shaped by logical and mathematical operations. 
“Experience is only possible through logico-mathematical forms com-
prising classification, order assignment, correspondence, function, etc. 
Reading out perceptive data in itself presupposes involvement of such 
forms or their more or less varied outlines.”62 Many of the concepts we 
use, both every day and in science, are not directly derived from 
problem situation. In this sense, if at the starting point someone decrees that they have definitively 
resolved a problem situation, with a formula uttered in a somewhat bombastic way, then he appears 
to evince some “childish” mannerism whereby everything must necessarily be the way he thinks 
and decides within his concept. The world is the way his concept states, admitting of no other op-
tion, and all other concepts are erroneous only because they are predicated on different premises 
than his own concept. In my opinion, such unfortunate propositions are a consequence of specific 
subjective determinants characterised by the predominance of some visionary element rather than 
logical justification of theses. And herein lie the possibilities for the research by such a metascience 
as psychology of philosophising.
 62 J. Piaget, Psychologia i epistemologia, op. cit., p. 82.
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experience.63 Such concepts as time, space, causation could never be de-
rived from experience, if not for the involvement of increasingly complex 
formal operations. For instance, in order to obtain the concept of space 
or causation, it is it necessary to connect data furnished by experience 
with the subject’s formal actions and operations which constitute a sys-
tem of specific logical and mathematical relationships without which the 
subject could never assimilate any objects.64 Perception always presup-
poses involvement of conceptual factors, more or less elaborate infer-
ences, with the aid of which the data provided by perception become 
transformed into increasingly complex operational structures. All this 
goes to support the arguments against all kinds of propositions of pre-
suppositionless and neutral starting points (Thomism), the adherents of 
which look for indisputable and atheoretical data. It is all the more dif-
ficult to defend them in the case of such theoretically advanced theories 
that can be found in philosophy/metaphysics. One might say that child-
ish “why” questions are theorised only to a slight degree, which is related 
to conceptual deficiency and inadequate language and vocabulary. As 
regards philosophy every question that is posed is predicated on a num-
ber of very strong theoretical assumptions without which formulating 
it would be pragmatically impossible. Complete neutrality and presup-
positionlessness could only occur in the case of the so-called unadorned 
sensation, and would apply to a very early period in the life of a small 
child who has not acquired skills at using language or categorising per-
ceptive data yet. That is why at no stage of ontogenesis is cognition about 
passive reading of perceptive data. After all, every experience entails 
specific formal actions and operations. Perceptions themselves organise 
themselves in such a manner that an outline of a concept arises within 
 63 The real world is not an open book in which one is free to read any theory. In order to “read 
out” anything of this world, one needs to accept a number of different theoretical assumptions, e.g. 
basic ones like those concerned with language semantics. The metaphor of “reading the world” 
brings mistaken associations whereby it might be possible to formulate theories without accepting 
any premises. Opening one’s eyes alone is not enough to get to know the real world, of which, for 
instance, Piaget’s theory of ontogenesis makes us acutely aware.
 64 See J. Piaget, Psychologia i epistemologia, op. cit., pp. 95–96.
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them.65 Piaget notes that the organisation of concepts involves sense and 
motor schemas, which from the viewpoint of ontogenesis play quite an 
important role, because they lead to the transformation of perceptive 
data into higher operational units. The more cognitive development pro-
gresses and becomes increasingly complex, the more human cognition 
becomes detached from things and focuses on the logical justification of 
judgements.66 This does not, however, mean that man loses interest in the 
real world. For he still lives in it and subjects all his cognitive actions to 
the acquisition of information, which enables his effective adjustment to 
it, but no longer on an ego-centric or animistic basis, but a realistic one.67 
Capacity for thought detached from things is an indication of normal 
mental and cognitive development. It contributes to the development of 
ability to make more and more skilful use of formal operations which are 
not concerned with things, but relationships between judgements and 
concepts. All this is not a sign of any apriorism, idealism or degeneration 
of cognition,68 resulting from abandoning some standard philosophical 
doctrine, but of normal and proper development determined by the laws 
of biological evolution.69 Because of this, the dilemma over whether “to 
acquire cognition or think” is from the viewpoint of ontogenesis ille-
gitimate and empirically groundless. Thinking and acquiring cognition 
constitute a certain functional unity (whole), which even for the sake of 
more in-depth epistemological analysis should not be splintered.70 In all 
 65 See J. Piaget, Psychologia i epistemologia, op. cit., p. 90.
 66 In the opinion of existential Thomists, it is our capacity for abstract thinking that makes us 
detach ourselves from that which is real and focus our mind on mental and essential aspects.
 67 The realistic attitude is one which prescinds from things instead of clinging tightly to them. 
The realistic attitude is one which prescinds from things instead of clinging tightly to them.
 68 Such propositions are common in works by Thomist authors, e.g. Gilson and Krąpiec, and 
his students, who essentially restrict themselves to repeating his opinions.
 69 Here I omit a broader context of the discussion on the use of evolutionary theory data in phil-
osophical epistemology. At greater length these problems have been discussed as part of the evolu-
tionary theory of cognition, which needs to be clearly distinguished from the concept of ontogen-
esis as approached by Piaget.
 70 Thomists agree that human cognition constitutes a certain functional whole. However, they 
abide by these alternatives, especially in their criticism of various idealist systems. They connect re-
alism with cognition, and idealism with thinking detached from a concretum. Abstract thinking is 
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of man’s cognitive functioning it would be difficult to find such moments 
in which he either only thinks or only acquires cognition. Perhaps only 
some philosophers (Thomists) know where the one ends and the other 
begins, and who can function in exactly this way. And that is why in this 
respect they can be real masters at drawing distinctions, but the question 
remains whether those distinctions are fortunate...
Final remarks
The analyses performed show that the conclusions drawn from the 
ontogenesis of cognition may challenge a number of findings which are 
concerned with the metaphysics of cognition, and which relate to the 
status of the “why” question, the nature and goals of cognition, the rela-
tionship between language and the world, as well as the realism of cogni-
tion and the manner of its justification. However, these conclusions do 
not definitively prejudge the value of any metaphysical endeavour. And 
that is why they do not need to be viewed as normative. They are sure to 
be rejected by many, which in philosophy is an absolutely normal situa-
tion and should not result in emotions running too high. A philosopher 
has some considerable latitude - in his analyses he can take into account 
data of empirical sciences, but he does not have to that. He may as well 
claim that they are of no conclusive significance for philosophy.71 But 
when we adopt a multi-faceted approach to the study of philosophical 
problems, we need to take account of the findings of empirical sciences.72 
suspicious exactly because it is detached from a real concretum. This thesis is conceptual (specula-
tive) and finds no justification in any data of experience, because the latter actually justifies the op-
posite: thinking and cognition constitute a realistic whole. Realism is not just a realism of cogni-
tion, but also a realism of thinking capable of becoming detached from the concrete and individual.
 71 Existential Thomists believe that the so-called scientific facts cannot disprove philosophical 
theses, because they are on a completely different epistemological plane than philosophical cogni-
tion. Hence, Thomist authors are likely to reject the presented arguments as an attempt at an a pri-
ori imposition on philosophy of data derived from ontogenesis, that is from a different cognitive 
plane.
 72 See J. Życiński, Filozofować w kontekście nauki, in: Rozmowy o filozofii, ed. A. Zieliński, 
M. Bagiński, J. Wojtysiak, Lublin 1996, pp. 213–248; J. Życiński, Wpływ nauk szczegółowych na 
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As regards epistemology, that may be about developmental psychology 
data. Not only are they helpful in correcting certain assertions of the 
metaphysics of cognition, but they also safeguard against propounding 
exotic theses which can be by no means corroborated by man’s mental 
or cognitive development. Ontogenesis does not show that the “why” 
question should be given up in the philosophical discourse. It just im-
plies that this question is perhaps not the most important one for the 
methodological identity of philosophy, and particularly for metaphysics. 
Perhaps it should be included within the context comprising all other 
questions posed by the cognisant subject, because only then can we ob-
tain a more realistic picture of the cognitive situation of man, who asks 
different questions, looking for more or less lasting answers.
Therefore, it is worth giving some more serious thought to the 
metatheoretical implications of the ontogenesis of cognition for the 
construction of a philosophical theory. They might prove helpful in the 
increasingly realistic depiction of the structure and function of human 
cognition in its multi-faceted relationships with the real reality.
Abstract 
The question “why” is generally thought to be one of the most important of philo- 
sophical questions. Indeed, many philosophers hold that it is responsible for defining the 
essential contours and identity of philosophical discourse itself. Moreover, all attempts 
to reject it are perceived as a manifestation of minimalist tendencies in philosophical 
research. This article presents Piaget’s views concerning the ontogenesis of the “why” 
question. After having reconstructed the latter, it seeks to spell out their potential philo- 
sophical implications. The author argues that ontogenetic considerations can certainly 
play a heuristic role in the formulation of philosophical theses and hypotheses, and that 
they can lead to a correcting of the conceptions we tend to have of certain philosophical 
questions – namely, ones that do not refer to any empirical data. 
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